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WHERE WILL ALL THE WASTE GO?: 
UTILIZING EXTENDED PRODUCER 
RESPONSIBILITY FRAMEWORK LAWS 
TO ACHIEVE ZERO WASTE 
ANTHONY A. AUSTIN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has a waste problem. It represents only five 
percent of the world population, yet it generates twenty-five to thirty 
percent of the world’s waste.1 In 2008, the United States generated 389.5 
million tons of municipal solid waste (MSW).2 As our economy and 
population continue to grow, our waste will continue to grow as well.3 
The obvious dilemma is that all of this waste, the byproduct of our 
economic advances, creates significant adverse environmental and public 
*Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable Diana L. Terry, Colorado Court of Appeals. J.D., Golden Gate 
University School of Law (2011); LL.M., Environmental and Natural Resources Law and Policy, 
University of Denver Sturm College of Law (2012). The author would like to thank his wife, 
Adrienne, colleague Luthien Niland, and Professor Justin Pidot for their endless support and 
assistance throughout this entire process, as well as the Golden Gate University Environmental Law 
Journal editorial board and Professor Ed Baskauskas for their much appreciated editing. The author 
would also like to thank Professor Rock Pring for his encouragement and for making this article 
possible. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the 
views of Judge Diana L. Terry or the Colorado Court of Appeals. 
 1 Robert Malone, World’s Worst Waste, FORBES.COM (May 24, 2006), 
www.forbes.com/2006/05/23/waste-worlds-worst-cx_rm_0524waste.html; BRENDA PLATT ET AL., 
INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, STOP TRASHING THE CLIMATE 1 (2008), available at 
www.stoptrashingtheclimate.org/fullreport_stoptrashingtheclimate.pdf. 
 2 Rob van Haaren et al., 17th Nationwide Survey of MSW Management in the U.S.: The 
State of Garbage in America, 47 BIOCYCLE 16, 16 (2010), available at 
www.seas.columbia.edu/earth/wtert/sofos/SOG2010.pdf. 
 3 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901(a) (Westlaw 2013); Steffen Lehmann, Resource Recovery and 
Materials Flow in the City: Zero Waste and Sustainable Consumption as Paradigms in Urban 
Development, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 28, 30 (2010). 
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health effects when landfilled or incinerated.4 
This Article explores the use of extended producer responsibility 
(EPR) laws to achieve the ultimate waste management goal: “zero 
waste.” Zero waste is achieved through the complete diversion of MSW 
from landfills and incinerators, resource conservation, and sustainable 
product redesign. Historically, MSW has been dumped in landfills or 
deposited in waste incinerators, practices that have allowed for robust 
commerce and economic growth. However, these typical waste 
management practices cause vast amounts of air, water, and soil 
pollution, increased greenhouse gas emissions, and other adverse 
environmental and public health issues associated with burying or 
burning our garbage. 
In response to these growing concerns, many cities and counties 
across the country have instituted zero waste policies by using recycling 
and composting and moving away from the common practices of burning 
or burying their waste. San Francisco’s zero waste policy is hailed as the 
most successful in the United States, with approximately seventy-seven 
percent diversion from landfills or incinerators.5 San Diego and Los 
Angeles each divert about two thirds of their waste; Seattle diverts about 
fifty-four percent.6 Despite the growing number of cities adopting zero 
waste policies, less than one quarter of all MSW generated in the United 
States is recycled or composted.7 
Moreover, as cities strive toward achieving 100 percent diversion it 
will become much more difficult to actually achieve complete waste 
diversion. Design, cost, and technological impediments prevent complete 
waste diversion. Recycling or composting the remaining products in the 
waste stream is not possible due to product composition, the cost for 
localities to bear, or the localities’ lack of technological ability to recover 
all products in the waste stream. EPR laws, which require the remaining 
products in the waste stream to be taken back by their producers and 
require the producers to engage in mandated resource recovery, may 
provide the solution to attaining the zero waste goals. This Article 
proposes a hybrid approach, under which localities recycle and compost 
to the maximum extent practicable, and an additional EPR framework 
law targets the remaining products in the waste stream by requiring the 
producers to take them back. This use of an EPR law in conjunction with 
zero waste policies would have many environmental and public health 
benefits. 
 4 Lehmann, supra note 3, at 29. 
 5 David Ferry, The Urban Quest for “Zero” Waste, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2011, at R7. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Van Haaren et al., supra note 2, at 20. This calculation is based on data from 2008. 
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To best achieve these goals, an effective EPR approach must 
contain certain adaptable elements. States have already been playing an 
active role in adopting legislation to reduce waste and the various 
externalities associated with its disposal. States should continue to be the 
standard bearers in developing EPR framework laws. Any EPR law 
should rely on an adaptable “framework” mechanism that allows the 
state to more efficiently target products posing waste management, 
public health, and environmental problems. Such a law should also 
include mandatory resource recovery goals once the product is collected, 
penalty and enforcement provisions, and vest decision-making authority 
with the state’s selected agency as opposed to the state’s legislature. 
Although no such state EPR law currently exists, the landscape of EPR 
laws in the United States is changing rapidly. Generally, states target one 
product per law, thereby requiring the legislature to pass a new law every 
time a product causes waste management and environmental problems. 
As of January 2013, thirty-two states have adopted seventy-five EPR 
laws as part of their statewide waste management policies.8 In 2010, 
Maine became the first and only state in the nation to adopt a framework 
law that, in contrast to the prevailing product-by-product approach, 
utilizes an established set of factors to determine whether to include 
products in its EPR take-back program.9 
Zero waste and EPR policies together can provide a solution to 
managing and preventing our increasing amounts of waste. Part II of this 
Article will explain how MSW is currently managed in the United States, 
what exactly MSW is and how much we are discarding or incinerating, 
as well as the environmental and public health impacts from our 
increasing amounts of waste. Part III will introduce and discuss the zero 
waste doctrine, its benefits, and the current status of zero waste policies 
in the United States. Part IV will then present the doctrine of EPR, its 
goals and purposes, and the necessary components of a successful EPR 
framework law. Finally, Part V will propose recommendations for future 
state EPR legislation and will also explore potential constitutional 
challenges to such EPR laws, as well as federal EPR legislation as an 
alternative. 
 8 Extended Producer Responsibility State Laws as of January 2013, PROD. STEWARDSHIP 
INST., www.productstewardship.us/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=280 (last visited Jan. 
2013). 
 9 See Press Release, Prod. Policy Inst., First State Producer Responsibility “Framework” 
Law Passed in Maine with Unanimous Bi-Partisan and Chamber of Commerce Support (Mar. 25, 
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
The United States disposes of a staggering amount of MSW, 
despoiling the land, air, and water, while contributing to climate change. 
State and local governments have taken the lead in reducing disposal 
practices that cause these manifold problems. However, current policies 
have not, and likely cannot, fully address all the issues. Even the most 
aggressive efforts by municipalities to facilitate recycling and 
composting fail to achieve complete diversion.10 
The EPA defines MSW as that which “we commonly use and throw 
away,” including “everyday items such as product packaging, grass 
clippings, furniture, clothing, bottles, food scraps, newspapers, 
appliances, batteries, and tires.”11 MSW in the United States is generally 
 10 This Article focuses on MSW and will not discuss the regulation or disposal of hazardous 
waste, which is managed through cooperative federalism between states and the federal government 
pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6921-6939F (Westlaw 
2013). While some solid waste products such as batteries and electronics contain hazardous 
materials, they will be included within the MSW group for the purposes of this Article. Other forms 
of waste include construction and demolition waste, and industrial and agricultural waste. See Van 
Haaren et al., supra note 2, at 17. This Article will not discuss these other forms of waste, because 
most of the items that make up these other forms of waste do not lend themselves to being 
redesigned, which is the focal point of the zero waste and EPR doctrines. Construction and 
demolition waste includes concrete, wood, asphalt, gypsum, bricks, and salvaged building 
components. See Construction and Demolition Materials, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industrial/cd/index.htm (last updated Nov. 15, 2012). Industrial waste is 
waste comes from industrial and commercial processes and includes cement kiln dust, oil and natural 
gas waste materials, fossil fuel combustion waste materials, mineral processing and mining waste 
materials, and medical waste. See Industrial Waste, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industrial/index.htm (last updated Nov. 19, 2012). 
The decision to focus only on MSW also stems from the fact that other studies, reports, and articles 
discussing waste management in the United States do so by focusing on individual forms of waste, 
particularly MSW. See, e.g., Van Haaren et al., supra note 2; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009 FACTS AND FIGURES (2010), available at 
www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/municipal/pubs/msw2009rpt.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
2009 Facts and Figures]. Moreover, the focus of this Article is on two doctrinal policy tools—zero 
waste and EPR—that currently focus on consumer products and other durable and nondurable goods 
that generally make up MSW. See Product Stewardship and Extended Producer Responsibility: 
Definitions and Principles, PROD. STEWARDSHIP INST., 
productstewardship.us/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=231 (last visited May 13, 2012); 
About EPR, PROD. POLICY INST., www.productpolicy.org/content/about-epr (last visited May 13, 
2012); What Is Zero Waste, ECO-CYCLE, ecocycle.org/zerowaste#principles (last visited Jan. 2, 
2013). Thus, it would be inconsistent to include other forms of waste that are not currently regulated 
by these doctrines. 
 11 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2009 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 10, at 4; U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE GENERATION, RECYCLING, AND DISPOSAL IN THE 
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managed at the state or local level12 in one of three ways: disposed in 
landfills, burned in waste-to-energy (WTE) combustion facilities, or 
recycled or composted.13 In 2008, the United States generated 
approximately 389.5 million tons of MSW.14 
Approximately sixty-nine percent (270 million tons) was sent to 
landfills, an estimated seven percent (almost 26 million tons) was 
combusted in WTE facilities, and just over twenty-four percent (nearly 
94 million tons) was recycled or composted (69 million tons were 
recycled and 24.5 million tons were composted).15 
Durable goods (those that last three years or more, such as 
appliances), non-durable goods (those that last less than three years, such 
UNITED STATES: FACTS AND FIGURES FOR 2010, at 2 (2011), available at 
www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/municipal/pubs/msw_2010_rev_factsheet.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, 2010 Facts and Figures]. MSW does not always lend itself to a precise definition 
depending on the materials contained therein. Some household solid wastes, for instance, can contain 
hazardous materials and yet may still end up in MSW landfills with other MSW. See Solid Waste: 
Laws and Regulations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY REGION 9, 
www.epa.gov/region9/waste/solid/laws.html#4 (last visited May 13, 2012). 
 12 See 39A C.J.S. Health & Environment § 169 (2003); 7 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS § 24:253 (3d ed. 2005). 
 13 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2009 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 10, at 11-16, 156-
169; Van Haaren et al., supra note 2, at 16. 
 14 Van Haaren et al., supra note 2, at 16-17. In separate studies, the EPA estimated that only 
243 million tons of MSW was generated in 2009 and 250 million tons generated in 2010. U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2009 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 10, at 2; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
2010 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 1. In their article, The State of Garbage in America, Van 
Haaren et al., explained the sizeable difference between the two estimates: “EPA estimates the 
tonnage landfilled as the difference between its estimate of MSW generated minus its estimate of 
what is sent to composting, recycling or WTE plants. The State of Garbage methodology, however, 
is based purely on tons managed via all four methods in the responding states.” Van Haaren et al., 
supra note 2, at 22. In a recent report, Columbia University further explained the discrepancy 
between the “State of Garbage” report and the EPA’s studies: 
The only source of state-by-state [MSW] data is the Columbia/BioCycle ‘State of Garbage’ 
survey. It is based on detailed questionnaires sent to the waste management departments of 
each state and subsequent analysis of these data. In 2008, the fifty states reported to the 
Columbia/BioCycle survey that a total of 270 million tons of MSW was disposed in U.S. 
landfills, while the EPA estimated . . . that only 136 million tons were landfilled in the same 
year. It should be noted that the EPA departments dealing with greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions of waste management use the Columbia/BioCycle numbers. 
N.J. THEMELIS ET AL., EARTH ENG’G CTR. OF COLUMBIA UNIV., ENERGY AND ECONOMIC VALUE OF 
NON-RECYCLED PLASTICS (NRP) AND MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTES (MSW) THAT ARE CURRENTLY 
LANDFILLED IN THE FIFTY STATES 9-10 (2011), available at jrnetsolserver.shorensteincente.netdna-
cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Report-from-Columbia-Universitys-Earth-Engineering-
Center.pdf. Therefore, the estimates from “The State of Garbage in America” of waste generated, 
recycled, composted, and combusted will be used. However, the EPA’s detailed studies of MSW 
composition characterized by material or by product categories will also be used because “The State 
of Garbage in America” does not provide such analysis. 
 15 Van Haaren et al., supra note 2, at 19-20. 
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as paper and plastic cups or plates), and containers and packaging16 
account for over seventy percent of the MSW generated; the remaining 
amount consists mainly of organic waste.17 Containers and packaging 
make up the largest product source at approximately thirty percent, and 
nondurable goods and durable goods make up twenty-two percent and 
nineteen percent, respectively.18 Containers and packaging are recycled 
at the greatest rates among all product categories, at approximately forty-
eight percent; nondurable goods and durable goods recovery rates are far 
lower, at about thirty-six percent and eighteen-and-a-half percent, 
respectively.19 Nonetheless, overall recovery among all product 
categories combined is a dismal thirty-four percent; the remaining sixty-
six percent is sent to landfills or waste incineration facilities.20 More 
importantly, containers and packaging, nondurable goods, and durable 
goods make up almost sixty-nine percent of the MSW landfilled or 
combusted, which further illustrates the opportunity to significantly 
reduce the disposal of these products through zero waste and EPR 
policies.21 
Generally, state and local governments manage waste recovery and 
disposal. They regulate the licensing of waste disposal facilities; the 
collection, storage, and disposal of waste; landfill closures; and waste 
incineration.22 States or localities also establish waste management plans, 
require the use of certain waste facilities or permits for the operation of 
such facilities, order cleanup measures, prohibit open dumping, establish 
just and equitable rates for waste collection and disposal, require 
mandatory recycling, and ban the sale of certain beverage containers.23 
This regulatory regime is a main reason why EPR laws have continued at 
the state level, rather than the federal level. 
Generating MSW and then landfilling or burning that waste creates 
numerous adverse environmental, public health, and land use effects.24 
 16 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2009 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 10, at 66. Typically, 
MSW is characterized by material type or product type. Id. at 34. Materials constituting MSW 
include paper and paperboard, glass, metals, plastics, rubber and leather, textiles, wood, and other 
organic wastes (such as food scraps and yard trimmings). Id. at 36. Products that make up MSW are 
categorized into durable goods, nondurable goods, containers and packaging, and food scraps and 
yard trimmings. Id. at 66, 68. 
 17 Id. at 68; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2010 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 6. 
 18 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2009 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 10, at 68; U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, 2010 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 6. 
 19 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2010 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 7. 
 20 Id. at 7-8. 
 21 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2009 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 10, at 74, 83, 94. 
 22 39A C.J.S. Health & Environment, supra note 12, § 169; 7 MCQUILLIN, supra note 12, § 
24:253. 
 23 39A C.J.S. Health & Environment, supra note 12, § 169. 
 24 See Lehmann, supra note 3, at 28-30; PLATT ET AL., supra note 1, at 4-7. 
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These consequences include water, soil, and air pollution, as well as 
various land use, climate change, and resources issues that are 
inextricably connected to unsustainable production and consumption 
practices.25 Moreover, these effects are negative externalities associated 
with the manufacture, purchase, use, collection, and disposal of goods 
and products: costs that are not borne by the consumer (in the price of the 
product) or the producer (in the cost of making and selling the product), 
but instead are externalized onto society in general.26 
For example, it was only twenty-five years ago that the EPA 
conducted a study of solid waste management in the United States and 
found that more than 500 MSW facilities violated groundwater 
standards, 845 violated air quality standards, and 660 were the source of 
surface water contamination.27 The findings resulted, in part, in the 
strengthening of EPA’s role in managing MSW through the Hazardous 
and Solid Waste Amendments to the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA).28 Nonetheless, despite the more stringent 
requirements governing solid waste disposal facilities, landfill runoff and 
leachate, which contains a variety of hazardous and poisonous chemicals, 
continue to pose a threat to soil and groundwater.29 
In addition, disposing of the vast majority of our MSW through 
landfilling and incineration emits substantial amounts of air pollutants 
and climate change-causing greenhouse gases. In the United States, 
landfills are the third largest source of methane—a greenhouse gas that is 
twenty-one times more potent than carbon dioxide30—emitting 117.5 
teragrams of carbon dioxide equivalent (TgCO2Eq) in 2009,
31 which is 
 25 See Lehmann, supra note 3, at 28-30; PLATT ET AL., supra note 1, at 4-7. 
 26 See Noah Sachs, Planning the Funeral at the Birth: Extended Producer Responsibility in 
the European Union and the United States, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 55-62 (2006); Daniel 
Shean, The Politics of Trash, 16 BUFF. ENVTL. L. J. 55, 70-77 (2008-2009); William J. Cantrell, 
Cleaning Up the Mess: United Haulers, The Dormant Commerce Clause, and Transaction Costs 
Economics, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 176 (2009). 
 27 Paula C. Murray & David B. Spence, Fair Weather Federalism and America’s Waste 
Disposal Crisis, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 71, 74 (2003); Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 53 
Fed. Reg. 33,314, 33,319 (Aug. 30, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257 and 258). 
 28 Murray & Spence, supra note 27, at 74; Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984). 
 29 Lehmann, supra note 3, at 28; G. FRED LEE & ANNE JONES-LEE, SOLID WASTE 
MANAGEMENT: U.S. EPA LINED-LANDFILL APPROACH NOT RELIABLE FOR PROTECTING PUBLIC 
HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 6 (2011), available at 
www.gfredlee.com/Landfills/Comblandfillsupdate.pdf. 
 30 Greenhouse Gas Properties, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
www.epa.gov/outreach/scientific.html (last updated June 22, 2010). 
 31 One teragram is equal to one million metric tons. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 





Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
228 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J. [Vol. 6 
 
approximately seventeen percent of the total U.S. anthropogenic methane 
emissions.32 The EPA has found that methane emissions have been 
increasing over the last decade and further anticipates that the total 
amount of MSW generated will continue to increase as the population 
grows.33 Additionally, waste incineration at WTE facilities emits 
substantial amounts of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrogen oxides.34 
In 2009, MSW combustion emitted 12.7 TgCO2Eq; burning plastics 
accounted for approximately half of those emissions.35 Moreover, WTE 
facilities emit more carbon dioxide per megawatt hour than coal-fired, 
oil-fired, or natural-gas-fired power plants.36 Lastly, when viewed 
throughout the entire life cycle, from extraction of resources, production, 
use, and disposal, products and packaging are associated with forty-four 
percent of U.S. greenhouse gases.37 Burning waste in WTE facilities also 
emits significant amounts of other air pollutants, such as mercury, lead, 
nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, particulate matter, volatile organic 
compounds, and dioxins.38 
Furthermore, creating products that ultimately end up in landfills or 
are burned in WTE facilities requires large amounts of energy and raw 
natural resources. For example, in 2006, U.S. citizens purchased 
approximately 31.2 billion liters of water, which was sold in plastic 
bottles, requiring 900,000 tons of plastic.39 In addition, “oil and natural 
 32 Id. at 8-1, 8-2. 
 33 Id. at 8-3. 
 34 Id. at 3-34. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Burning MSW in WTE facilities emits 2,988 lbs/megawatt-hour (MWh) of carbon 
dioxide; burning coal emits 2,249 lbs/MWh of carbon dioxide, burning oil emits 1,672 lbs/MWh of 
carbon dioxide, and burning natural gas emits 1,135 lbs/MWh of carbon dioxide. Clean Energy: Air 
Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/air-
emissions.html (last updated Oct. 17, 2012); PLATT ET AL., supra note 1, at 9. Proponents of WTE, 
however, argue that carbon dioxide emissions from WTE facilities are much lower because biomass-
based emissions are part of the Earth’s natural carbon cycle and, therefore, do not contribute to a net 
increase in carbon dioxide emissions. See SOLID WASTE ASS’N OF N. AM., COMPARISON OF AIR 
EMISSIONS FROM WASTE-TO-ENERGY FACILITIES TO FOSSIL FUEL POWER PLANTS 6, at n.8 (2006), 
available at www.metrovancouver.org/services/solidwaste/planning/ReportsforQA/SWANA.pdf. 
 37 JOSHUAH STOLAROFF, PROD. POLICY INST., PRODUCTS, PACKAGING AND U.S. 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 5 (2009), available at 
www.productpolicy.org/ppi/attachments/PPI_Climate_Change_and_Products_White_Paper_Septem
ber_2009.pdf. This statistic includes the impacts from producing products abroad and consuming 
them in the United States. 
 38 ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, WASTE-TO-ENERGY: DIRTYING MARYLAND’S AIR BY 
SEEKING A QUICK FIX ON RENEWABLE ENERGY? 2-7 (2011); Clean Energy: Municipal Solid Waste, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/municipal-sw.html 
(last updated Oct. 17, 2012). 
 39 Bottled Water and Energy: A Fact Sheet, PAC. INST., 
www.pacinst.org/topics/water_and_sustainability/bottled_water/bottled_water_and_energy.html 
(last visited May 13, 2012). 
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gas are the major raw materials used to produce plastics,”40 and 
producing these plastic bottles required 106 billion megajoules of energy, 
the equivalent of seventeen million barrels of oil.41 Moreover, making 
one liter of bottled water requires three liters of water.42 Another 
illustration is the plastic bag, of which approximately 100 billion are 
used each year in the United States, requiring twelve million barrels of 
oil to produce.43 
Lastly, the current model of landfilling massive amounts of MSW is 
unsustainable. As of 2009, there are 1,908 landfills in operation in the 
United States,44 and although the number of landfills has decreased, their 
overall size has increased.45 In light of the ever-growing amount of 
waste, cities and states all over the country are running out of landfill 
space. For instance, San Francisco may run out of landfill space by 
2014.46 Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island each have 
about twelve years of capacity remaining.47 New York has about twenty-
five years left.48 
III. EXPLORING ZERO WASTE POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
In exercising their waste management authority, many cities and 
counties have implemented zero waste policies as a means of fully 
diverting solid waste away from landfills and incinerators. Most, if not 
all, of these policies have included aggressive recycling and composting 
programs. However, those programs do not appear to be able to achieve 
complete waste diversion. 
A. ZERO WASTE DEFINED 
The most basic concept of zero waste can be synthesized into one 
simple notion: that all solid waste should be diverted from landfills and 
 40 Lifecycle of a Plastic Product, AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, 
plastics.americanchemistry.com/Life-Cycle#top (last visited May 13, 2012). 
 41 PAC. INST., supra note 39. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Jennie Reilly Romer, Comment, The Evolution of San Francisco’s Plastic-Bag Ban, 1 
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L. J. 439, 442-43 (2007). 
 44 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2009 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 10, at 168. 
 45 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2010 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 10. 
 46 Lehmann, supra note 3, at 29. 
 47 See Van Haaren et al., supra note 2, at 20; Brian Palmer, Go West, Garbage Can!, SLATE 
(Feb. 15, 2011), 
www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/the_green_lantern/2011/02/go_west_garbage_can.single
.html. 
 48 Palmer, supra note 47. 
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incinerators.49 In its practical application, zero waste has become a 
policy goal of diverting 100 percent of solid waste, in particular waste 
from end-of-life materials and products, from landfills or incinerators 
through product reuse, recycling, and composting.50 Zero waste also 
incorporates principles of sustainable product design and manufacturing, 
as well as other waste reduction tools to work toward a future in which 
waste is completely eliminated.51 As a doctrine, zero waste can include 
elements of EPR, such as making the manufacturer responsible for a 
product’s entire lifecycle and ultimately redesigning the product to be 
more recyclable or reusab 52
However, the doctrine is not solely about recycling or composting, 
and cannot be about total waste elimination either given technological 
limitations. In light of these two aspects, which encompass several waste 
management and reduction tools, the ultimate goals of a zero waste 
policy include waste diversion, resource conservation, and product 
redesign. These goals will be highlighted further when exploring the vital 
elements of a successful EPR law, which can ultimately serve as the 
means of achieving those goals by filling in the gaps where a city’s zero 
waste policy falls short.53 
B. CURRENT WASTE DIVERSION AND RESOURCE CONSERVATION 
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 
Cities and counties that have adopted zero waste policies are largely 
focused on waste diversion. Two readily available tools to achieve waste 
diversion are recycling and composting.54 Recycling and composting our 
 49 S.F. Dep’t of the Env’t, Zero Waste, SFENVIRONMENT.ORG, 
www.sfenvironment.org/zero-waste (last visited Dec. 28, 2012). 
 50 See generally id.; Waste Reduction Best Practices, GREEN CITIES CALIFORNIA.ORG, 
www.greencitiescalifornia.org/best-practices/waste-reduction/index.html (last updated Sept. 1, 
2009). 
 51 ECO-CYCLE, supra note 10. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See Lehmann, supra note 3, at 31. 
 54 Although composting is similar to landfilling in the very limited sense that both involve 
storing waste on land, composting is different in at least one significant respect. With the 
composting process a beneficial and valuable end product is created—compost—that is used as a 
“nutrient-rich soil amendment capable of improving depleted or disturbed soil environments.” Cal. 
Dep’t of Res. Recycling and Recovery, Organic Material Management Compost—What Is It?, 
CALRECYCLE, www.calrecycle.ca.gov/organics/compostmulch/CompostIs.htm#Important (last 
updated May 5, 2006). In addition to improving soil conditions, composting reduces GHG emissions 
and reduces the need for water, fertilizer, pesticides, and herbicides—all benefits that landfilling 
does not provide. See id.; Composting, Environmental Benefits, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
www.epa.gov/compost/benefits.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2012); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS THROUGH RECYCLING AND COMPOSTING 11 (2011), 
available at 
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MSW has numerous environmental benefits and can serve as a source of 
job creation and local revenue generation.55 First, the United States’ total 
recycling and composting efforts in 2010 saved more than 1.3 quadrillion 
BTUs56 of energy, equivalent to more than 229 million barrels of oil.57 In 
particular, recycling requires significantly less energy than does mining, 
extracting, and manufacturing virgin resources.58 In his article on 
resource recovery and zero waste policies, Dr. Steffen Lehmann found 
that “there is a ninety-five percent energy saving when using secondary 
(recycled) aluminum; eighty-five percent for copper; eighty percent for 
plastics; seventy-four percent for steel; and sixty-four percent for 
paper.”59 Moreover, recovery through product recycling curbs not just 
the level of MSW generated, but the level of other discards as well. In a 
joint report, the Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Eco-Cycle, and the 
Global Anti-Incinerator Alliance found that “[f]or every ton of discarded 
products and materials destroyed by incinerators and landfills, about 
[seventy-one] tons of manufacturing, mining, oil and gas exploration, 
agricultural, coal combustion, and other discards are produced.”60 
Recycling also reduces air and water pollution that would arise from the 
mining and extraction of virgin materials.61 
Second, recycling and composting leads to reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions. In addition to saving energy, the total amount of MSW 
recycled and composted in 2010 amounted to a reduction of more than 
186 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2Eq), 
www.epa.gov/region10/pdf/climate/wccmmf/Reducing_GHGs_through_Recycling_and_Compostin
g.pdf; Sally Brown et al., Greenhouse Gas Balance for Composting Operations, 37 J. ENVTL. 
QUALITY 1396, 1396-97 (2008); Sally Brown & Scott Subler, Composting and Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions: A Producer’s Perspective, 48 BIOCYCLE 37 (2007). 
 55 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
THROUGH MATERIALS AND LAND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 8 (2009); Matt Ewadinger & Scott 
Mouw, Recycling Creates Jobs and Boosts Economy, 46 BIOCYCLE 43 (2005), available at 
www.biocycle.net/2005/10/recycling-creates-jobs-and-boosts-economy/. 
 56 British Thermal Unit, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/80372/British-thermal-unit-BTU (last visited May 13, 2012). 
 57 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2010 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 6. However, it is 
likely that the actual amounts are higher; these figures are based on the EPA’s estimation that only 
85 million tons of MSW were recycled or composted in 2010. As explained above, supra note 14, a 
study conducted by BioCycle and Columbia University estimated that the United States generated 
389.5 million tons of waste and recycled or composted 94 million tons. Van Haaren et al., supra note 
2, at 20. Therefore, 94 million tons of MSW recycled or composted likely resulted in more than 1.3 
quadrillion BTUs of energy saved. 
 58 Lehmann, supra note 3, at 32. 
 59 Id.; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WASTEWISE (2010), available at 
www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/municipal/pubs/msw_2010_rev_factsheet.pdf. 
 60 PLATT ET AL., supra note 1, at 4. 
 61 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2010 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 10; U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, supra note 55, at 8. 
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which achieves the same carbon reduction as would taking thirty-six 
million cars off the road.62 In their recent study, Stop Trashing the 
Climate, which analyzed zero waste strategies as a means of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, the Institute for Local Self-Reliance, the 
Global Anti-Incinerator Alliance, and Eco-Cycle found that “preventing 
waste and expanding reuse, recycling, and composting programs—that 
is, aiming for zero waste—is one of the fastest, cheapest, and most 
effective strategies available for combating climate change.”63 Moreover, 
the EPA has concluded that increasing recycling and composting rates to 
100 percent—thereby achieving complete MSW diversion—would 
equate to a reduction of 300 MMTCO2Eq per year.
64 
While complete waste diversion may not be currently achievable, it 
is a target for cities and counties to aim for in their pursuit of increasing 
waste diversion, resource conservation, and an overall closed-loop 
economy. 
Of the 389.5 million tons of MSW generated in 2008, only twenty-
four percent, or ninety-four million tons, was recycled or composted, 
leaving the rest to be landfilled or incinerated.65 While these figures are 
national, recycling and composting rates vary by city, state, and region. 
The western United States region (California, Nevada, Oregon, and 
Washington) has the highest rate of recycling and composting, at forty-
six percent.66 Conversely, the Rocky Mountain region (Arizona, 
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) has the 
lowest rate, at only eleven percent.67 The Midwest, New England, and 
Mid-Atlantic regions recycle and compost at a rate of twenty-two to 
twenty-nine percent.68 Nonetheless, even with the western states’ 
recycling and composting efforts, these rates are not high enough to stop 
the adverse environmental effects of landfilling and incinerating. 
In response to the adverse environmental and public health effects 
 62 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2010 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 4. The same 
logical assumption governing an increase in the amount of energy saved applies here as well, for the 
reasons explained in footnote 57. While the composting process is a very minor source of methane, 
volatile organic compounds, and ammonia, its environmental benefits (overall methane and other 
GHG emission reductions from landfill diversion; enhanced carbon sequestration by the soil; and a 
reduced need for water, fertilizers and pesticides) greatly outweigh its costs. See Compost Emissions 
Work Group, CAL. AIR RES. BD., www.arb.ca.gov/cc/compost/compost.htm (last updated Dec. 21, 
2011); Composting, Environmental Benefits; Composting, Environmental Benefits, supra note 54; 
REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS THROUGH RECYCLING AND COMPOSTING, supra note 54, 
at 10-11; Brown et al. supra note 54, at 1396-97; Brown & Subler, supra note 54, at 37. 
 63 PLATT ET AL., supra note 1, at 1. 
 64 U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, supra note 55, at 22, box 6. 
 65 Van Haaren et al., supra note 2, at 20. 
 66 Id. at 16, 20. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
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discussed above, dozens of cities throughout the United States are 
seriously addressing the growing MSW problem. For example, thirty-six 
U.S. city mayors have joined eighty other city mayors from all over the 
world in signing the United Nations Environmental Accords.69 The 
Environmental Accords are a set of objectives aimed at creating an 
“ecologically sustainable, economically dynamic, and socially equitable 
future.”70 Three of the objectives are aimed at waste reduction, with one 
specifically calling for signatory cities to establish a zero waste goal and 
achieve complete MSW diversion by 2040.71 Accordingly, several U.S. 
cities have enacted zero waste goals, including Oakland, California; San 
Francisco, California; San Jose, California; and Seattle, Washington.72 
Several other localities that are not signatories to the Environmental 
Accords, such as Boulder County, Colorado, and Alameda, California, 
have proactively adopted zero waste goals as well.73 
No two zero waste goals, however, are the same. Each goal has 
different benchmarks and different deadlines for achieving waste 
diversion. Furthermore, some cities and counties are close to reaching 
their respective goals, as shown by San Francisco’s progress in 
approaching eighty percent diversion through recycling and composting 
efforts alone.74 San Francisco takes credit for having the most stringent 
zero waste goal and the greatest rate of MSW diversion in the United 
States. The city currently diverts at seventy-seven percent.75 It met its 
2010 benchmark of seventy-five percent diversion and is now working 
 69 S.F. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T.,URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS SIGNING CITIES (2011), 
available at www.sfenvironment.org/sites/default/files/editor-
uploads/initiatives/uea_List_of_signing_Cities.pdf. 
 70 See URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (2005), available at 
www.sfenvironment.org/sites/default/files/editor-
uploads/initiatives/uea_Urban_Environmental_Accords.pdf. 
 71 Id. 
 72 S.F. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T., supra note 69; Oakland, Cal., Res. 79774 C.M.S. (Mar. 7, 
2006), available at clerkwebsvr1.oaklandnet.com/attachments/13137.pdf; S.F., Cal., Res. 679-02 
(Sept. 30, 2002), available at www.sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/resolutions02/r0679-02.pdf; 
San Jose, Cal., Res. 74077 (Oct. 30, 2007), available at 
www3.sanjoseca.gov/clerk/ORDS_RESOS/RESO_74077.pdf; Seattle, Wash., Res. 30990 (July 16, 
2007), available at clerk.seattle.gov/~archives/Resolutions/Resn_30990.pdf. 
 73 BOULDER CITY COUNCIL, A RESOLUTION DECLARING BOULDER A ZERO WASTE 
COMMUNITY (May 2, 2006), available at 
ecocycle.org/files/pdfs/ARESOLUTIONDECLARINGBOULDERAZEROWASTECOMMUNITY.
pdf; Boulder County, Colo., Res. 2010-143, (Dec. 9, 2010), available at 
www.bouldercounty.org/doc/sustainability/zerowasteresolution2010.pdf; CITY OF ALAMEDA, ZERO 
WASTE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, at ES-1 (2010), available at 
www.cityofalamedaca.gov/getdoc.cfm?id=5700. 
 74 Ferry, supra note 5; S.F. Dep’t of the Env’t, supra note 49. 
 75 Ferry, supra note 5; S.F. Dep’t of the Env’t, supra note 49. 
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toward its 2020 zero waste goal of 100 percent.76 The cost for residential 
waste collection in San Francisco is $27.55 per month, which is the cost 
for the black “garbage” container alone; the blue recycling and green 
composting containers are provided at no cost.77 If a resident can reduce 
his or her landfill waste to fit into a smaller, twenty-gallon garbage 
container, then the cost is reduced to $21.21 per month.78 San Francisco 
has also enacted an ordinance mandating recycling and composting by all 
persons, firms, businesses, associations, corporations, and government 
entities in the city.79 Seattle, on the other hand, currently diverts about 
fifty-four percent of its MSW; although this is a laudable and necessary 
effort, this rate misses its 2012 benchmark of sixty percent diversion 
(Seattle’s ultimate goal is seventy percent diversion by 2025).80 
Despite these growing local efforts, the current zero waste goals 
alone are not enough to address the growing MSW problem in the United 
States. Even with these goals in place, San Francisco is the only city 
close to achieving complete diversion. Additionally, some cities do not 
even consider their zero waste goals to mean actual “zero” waste. 
Instead, these cities rely on the definition from the Zero Waste 
International Alliance, which considers ninety percent diversion to be 
zero waste.81 
The larger issue, though, is that not all products that make up our 
MSW are capable of being recycled or composted by local governments. 
While ninety percent waste diversion is certainly a reasonably attainable 
goal for cities like San Francisco,82 the looming question is how to divert 
the remaining ten (or fifteen or twenty) percent. One solution proposed 
by many city officials is to incinerate the remaining amount in WTE 
facilities.83 However, this option overlooks the fact that zero waste 
means diversion from not only landfills, but incinerators as well. 
Furthermore, despite state-of-the-art emission control systems,84 
combusting MSW in WTE facilities still emits significant amounts of air 
pollutants, including mercury, lead, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, 
 76 Ferry, supra note 5; S.F. Dep’t of the Env’t, supra note 49. 
 77 Residential Rates, RECOLOGY, www.sunsetscavenger.com/residentialRates.htm (last 
visited May 12, 2012). 
 78 Id. 
 79 S.F., Cal., Ordinance 100-09 (June 9, 2009). 
 80 Ferry, supra note 5; Seattle, Wash., Res. No. 30990 (July 16, 2007). 
 81 Ferry, supra note 5; see Zero Waste Definition, ZERO WASTE INT’L ALLIANCE, 
zwia.org/standards/zw-definition/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). 
 82 See Ferry, supra note 5. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Elisabeth Rosenthal, Europe Finds Clean Energy in Trash, but U.S. Lags, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 13, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/04/13/science/earth/13trash.html. 
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particulate matter, volatile organic compounds, and dioxins.85 Looking to 
WTE facilities as a solution also fails to address the issue of resource 
conservation, because these facilities incinerate valuable materials that 
could instead be recycled into new products.86 Thus, burning the 
remaining MSW is not an optimal solution. 
Because traditional waste management techniques are failing and 
WTE cannot address the adverse environmental and public health effects 
or the resource conservation and product redesign goals, another solution 
is necessary. EPR laws have the potential to close that gap on the 
remaining MSW that cannot be composted or recycled through local 
efforts. EPR laws are a growing trend in the United States87 and they 
operate as a means of realizing complete waste diversion from landfills 
and incinerators, resource conservation, and product redesign, which 
help move toward a more sustainable society in the process. 
IV. ACHIEVING ZERO WASTE THROUGH EXTENDED PRODUCER 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Cities and counties currently utilize recycling and composting 
measures in order to divert as much MSW from landfills or incinerators 
as possible. However, while absolutely necessary, these efforts are not 
enough. In looking to the future, a hybrid approach should be adopted, 
whereby local governments (or third-party waste management companies 
hired by localities) continue to recycle and compost to the greatest extent 
practicable, and once those efforts are exhausted, EPR laws would 
address those products that remain in the waste stream. EPR laws, when 
designed to force the producer to take back a product at the end of its life 
and engage in resource recovery, can close the gap on the remaining 
MSW that cannot feasibly be recycled, composted, or reused. 
While such a role of EPR or product stewardship would rely further 
on city and county waste collection services, this approach is consistent 
with the current recycling and composting practices of many local 
 85 ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, supra note 38, at 2-7; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra 
note 38. 
 86 Ferry, supra note 5. 
 87 Letter from Scott Cassel, Exec. Dir. & Founder, Prod. Stewardship Inst., to Assemb. 
Member Nancy Skinner, Chair, Cal. Assemb. Comm. on Natural Res., Support for Assembly Bill 
283 (Apr. 14, 2009), available at 
www.productstewardship.us/associations/6596/files/PSI%20support%20for%20CA%20AB%20283
%20framework%20bill%20%204-14-09.pdf; Letter from Scott Cassel, Exec. Dir. & Founder, Prod. 
Stewardship Inst., to Rep. Ben Cannon, Chairman, Or. House Env’t and Water Comm., Support for 
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governments. Certainly, expanding recycling and composting efforts to 
the greatest extent possible will have costs, and each locality will have to 
determine what is feasible given these costs and the technology required 
for increased resource recovery. Still, cities like San Francisco have 
shown that getting to eighty percent or more of MSW diversion simply 
through recycling and composting practices is possible. 
A. DEFINING EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY 
EPR take-back laws work by requiring the producers of products 
that cause waste management, public health, environmental, and other 
adverse issues to take back their products at the end of the products’ 
lives. The main concept is that the responsibility and costs of managing, 
recycling, and disposing of a particular product is to be borne by the 
producer of that product, rather than society. The theoretical 
underpinning of EPR take-back laws is that by requiring the producer to 
take responsibility—both financial and physical—for the product, the 
internalization of these costs by the producer should serve as an incentive 
for the producer to redesign the product to be more recyclable, 
compostable, and or reusable—in other words, more sustainable.88 This 
logic is a purely economic, market-based approach that arises from the 
desire, or need, to internalize those product externalities, such as the cost 
of waste disposal and the associated environmental and health impacts, 
with the producer.89 In addition to potentially curing such market 
failures, EPR laws also help achieve waste diversion and resource 
conservation.90 
 88 See STEPHEN SMITH, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR EVALUATING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY 
PROGRAMMES 7-8 (2005), 
search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&cote=env/epoc/wgwpr(2
005)6/final; PROD. STEWARDSHIP INST, supra note 8; About EPR, PROD. POLICY INST., 
www.productpolicy.org/content/about-epr (last visited May 10, 2012); Extended Producer 
Responsibility, INFORM, www.informinc.org/pages/research/waste-prevention/extended-producer-
responsibility.html (last visited May 10, 2012). 
 89 See Sachs, supra note 26, at 56-57; Hannah McCrea, Note, Germany’s “Take-Back” 
Approach to Waste Management: Is There a Legal Basis for Adoption in the United States?, 23 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 513, 515-17 (2011). 
 90 A related doctrine, known as product stewardship, shares most of the EPR elements. 
However, they differ in one major regard: traditionally, EPR laws provided that only the producers 
should bear the responsibility and costs of managing their products at the end of life. Product 
stewardship laws, on the other hand, impose responsibility on all those involved in the life of the 
product: producers, retailers, and consumers. See Product Stewardship and Extended Producer 
Responsibility: Definitions and Principles, PROD. STEWARDSHIP INST., 
productstewardship.us/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=231 (last visited May 15, 2012). In 
part due to their doctrinal similarities, the growing trend is to use the terms EPR and “product 
stewardship” interchangeably. See Garth Hickle, The Evolving Product Stewardship Policy 
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Because management of MSW in the United States is traditionally 
undertaken by cities and states, and because there has been a lack of 
federal action in this area, states have taken the lead in addressing the 
MSW problem through innovative EPR laws. As of January 2013, thirty-
two states have enacted seventy-five EPR laws.91 Among these laws, 
nine product categories are regulated: mercury-filled automobile 
switches, batteries, carpet, cell phones, electronics, fluorescent lighting, 
mercury thermostats, paint, and pesticide containers.92 However, no state 
regulates all nine categories, and most states regulate only one or two.93 
In addition to these nine, several other product categories have been 
introduced in state legislation across the United States in the last three 
years, including mattresses, medical sharps, smoke detectors, packaging, 
and pharmaceutical drugs.94 
In his article discussing the success of EPR legislation in the 
European Union, Professor Noah Sachs provides a critique of EPR, and 
in so doing brings attention to two of its goals: full cost internalization 
and the subsequent product redesign. While Professor Sachs does not 
dispute the “downstream impacts” of EPR—that EPR reduces the 
volume of waste to be landfilled or incinerated, thereby diverting toxic 
chemicals from the waste stream, and also reduces the pressure on 
extracting virgin resources—he argues that EPR is not always successful 
in accomplishing the “upstream impacts,” thus forcing the cost 
internalization and subsequent redesign of certain products.95 He 
explains that in order to have true cost internalization, and therefore 
incentive to redesign, a producer must have “individual responsibility” 
over its own products instead of “collective responsibility,” under which 
the entire industry shares in the costs of taking back the product.96 
However, individual responsibility, he argues, faces large transactional 
costs and thus is not feasible.97 He further concludes that collective 
responsibility, which is what most European EPR laws utilize, fails to 
Landscape in the United States: A State Perspective 1, at the ABA Section of Environment, Energy, 
and Resources Section Fall Meeting (Oct. 13, 2011); PROD. POLICY INST., PROD. STEWARDSHIP 
INST. & CAL. PROD. STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, PROD. STEWARDSHIP AND EXTENDED PRODUCER 
RESPONSIBILITY: DEFINITIONS AND PRINCIPLES (2012), available at www.calpsc.org/admin-
document-upload/doc_download/11-ppi-psi-cpsc-epr-principles. 
 91 PROD. STEWARDSHIP INST., supra note 8. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Extended Producer Responsibility Legislation as of December 31, 2012, PROD. 
STEWARDSHIP INST., productstewardship.us/associations/6596/files/PSActiveLegislation2012.cfm. 
 95 Sachs, supra note 26, at 63-65. 
 96 Id. at 75-76. 
 97 Id. at 76. 
17
Austin: Zero Waste
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
238 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J. [Vol. 6 
nited States. 
 
effectuate true cost internalization and product redesign.98 Though 
Professor Sachs accurately concludes that EPR is able to achieve waste 
diversion and resource conservation, his argument that EPR laws are 
unable to achieve cost internalization and product redesign presents only 
one view and is arguably incorrect. It is also important to note that 
Professor Sachs’s article came out in 2006, before most of the EPR laws 
in the United States were passed. Hence, it is too soon to see a direct link 
between EPR and product redesign in the U
There is evidence of a direct link between EPR laws and redesign in 
other countries. The International Institute for Industrial Environmental 
Economics at Lund University has concluded that, in practice, individual 
responsibility is feasible and that EPR laws have proven to be successful 
in internalizing costs and incentivizing redesign.99 The Institute’s report 
on the matter concludes, as did Professor Sachs, that individual producer 
responsibility is necessary to achieve true cost internalization and 
product redesign.100 However, unlike Professor Sachs, the Institute 
presents empirical evidence that “unequivocally illustrates that 
manufacturers have designed their products to meet anticipated and 
existing demands from EPR.”101 As a direct consequence of EPR laws 
employing individual producer responsibility, electronics and car 
manufacturers in Sweden and Japan have taken concrete measures to 
reduce the amount of materials used, prolong the products’ or cars’ lives, 
ease the disassembly or separation of the products, reduce the use of 
hazardous substances, enhance component and material re-use, and 
increase the recyclability of materials.102 Lastly, while the Institute’s 
report maintains that individual producer responsibility is vital, it also 
suggests that producers may be allowed to choose to collectively 
organize take-back and recycling systems so long as each producer 
maintains individual financial responsibility103 for its own new 
products.104 
In addition to his theory about the success of EPR laws, Professor 
Sachs also accurately highlights the importance of achieving product 
redesign in measuring the success and necessity of EPR laws. He poses 
 98 Id. at 76-77. 
 99 CHRIS VAN ROSSEM ET AL., INT’L INST. FOR INDUS. ENVTL. ECONS., EXTENDED 
PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY: AN EXAMINATION OF ITS IMPACT ON INNOVATION AND GREENING 
PRODUCTS (2006). 
 100 Id. at 6-7. 
 101 Id. at 14. 
 102 Id. at 14-15, 19-20. 
 103 Financial responsibility is defined in the report as the producer covering all or part of the 
costs for the collection, recycling, or final disposal of its products. Id. at 2. 
 104 Id. at 25. 
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the question, “If EPR is similar to other recycling programs in achieving 
downstream impacts and resource benefits, then what is the added value 
of producer responsibility?”105 In other words, why require the 
producers, and not some other entity or government agency, to take back 
their products? The answer is that only the producer designs and 
manufactures the product, and thus only the producer has the ability to 
redesign the product to be more sustainable.106 Moreover, even in the 
absence of actual redesign, shifting costs back to the producers will 
likely have an effect on price and thus consumer demand for those 
regulated products. Therefore, while the market elasticity of demand for 
the product will indeed play a role,107 EPR may still be able to eliminate 
negative externalities and optimize the purchase of products despite the 
doctrine’s arguable inability to effectuate product redesign. 
B. THE ELEMENTS OF EPR 
Presented below is a discussion of five concepts or mechanisms that 
are part of current EPR laws and the framework for EPR legislation: the 
product selection mechanism, the product take-back method, the product 
recovery mechanism and performance goal, the product design goal, and 
the enforcement mechanism. These are key strategies to EPR programs, 
and decisions about them can affect the efficacy of the program. While 
this list is not exhaustive, it includes those concepts that are arguably 
most important in crafting successful EPR laws. 
1. Product Selection Mechanisms 
The first strategy that will be explored is the mechanism by which 
states select the products to be regulated under the states’ EPR laws. 
There are two different means of determining which products to regulate: 
1. a separate EPR law that is enacted by the legislature to target each 
particular product (the “product-by-product” approach), and 2. an EPR 
 105 Sachs, supra note 26, at 75. 
 106 One major alternative to the take-back EPR policy approach is the use of advanced 
recovery fees (ARFs). An ARF is an extra fee that the consumer pays to the retailer for a particular 
product, such as an electronic good, at the time of purchase; the retailer then forwards the fee to the 
governmental authority or other organization that is responsible for the collection, recycling, and 
resource recovery of that product. NW. PROD. STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, FRONT-END FINANCING 
(FEF) SCENARIOS FOR COLLECTION/RECYCLING OF ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS 2 (2004), available at 
productstewardship.net/PDFs/productsElectronicsFinancingScenarios.pdf. The chief concern with 
ARFs, however, is that the producer and the incentive for sustainable product redesign are 
completely absent from the equation. Id. at 3. Therefore, if the goal is sustainable product redesign 
(as it is with EPR and zero waste policies), it is the producer that should bear the responsibility of 
taking back and managing products at the end of life. 
 107 See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 482 (2010). 
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law that institutes a framework mechanism under which the state relies 
upon a specific set of criteria and factors when determining which 
products to regulate under its EPR program.108 The latter framework 
approach has two variations: the “framework/legislature” approach and 
the “framework/agency” approach. 
The product-by-product approach involves the state’s legislature 
passing an entirely new law for each product to be regulated under an 
EPR take-back program. Historically, in the United States, the general 
process behind state EPR legislation has reflected a product-by-product 
approach: whenever a state chooses to regulate a particular product or 
product category, it will enact an entirely new statute for that single 
product or product category.109 Over the years, some states have 
established several EPR laws. California and Maine, for example, each 
have six EPR laws for six separate products; Vermont has five; Maryland 
has four; and Illinois, Iowa, New Jersey, and Rhode Island each have 
three.110 
The obvious concern with the traditional, product-by-product 
approach is that each time a state determines that a particular product 
needs to be regulated under the state’s EPR program, it must pass new 
legislation. As with any piece of legislation, the bill must be passed by 
both chambers of the legislature and then signed by the governor. 
Throughout the political process, the bill must navigate the mounting 
pressures from special interest and lobbyist groups aimed at defeating the 
bill. The result is a tedious, drawn-out, and inefficient process. 
An EPR framework law differs from the product-by-product 
approach because instead of passing a new law for each product to be 
regulated, a framework law gives the state the ability to address multiple 
products under one law based on a set of criteria or factors.111 The 
criteria used to recommend or select products generally include whether 
regulating the product has the potential to reduce waste, toxicity, 
greenhouse gas emissions, or other environmental or health impacts; the 
potential to encourage product redesign or manufacture that reduces 
environmental or health impacts; the public demand or need for 
improved recycling, reuse, or disposal practices; the potential to increase 
recovery of materials for reuse and recycling; the potential to reduce the 
costs of waste management to local governments and taxpayers; and the 
success in regulating the product in similar programs in other states or 
 108 See EPR/Product Stewardship Q&A, PROD. POLICY INST., 
www.productpolicy.org/content/eprproduct-stewardship-q#framework (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
 109 See Prod. Policy Inst., supra note 9. 
 110 PROD. STEWARDSHIP INST., supra note 8. 
 111 PROD. POLICY INST., supra note 108. 
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countries.112 A new chapter in state EPR law began in 2010 when Maine 
passed the nation’s first EPR framework law.113 Following Maine’s lead, 
eight states have introduced EPR framework bills in their legislature: 
California, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and Washington.114 As of January 2013, none of these bills has 
passed to become law.115 
These framework laws can take two different approaches. Under the 
first, the “framework/legislature” approach, the state agency uses 
established selection criteria and factors to recommend to the legislature 
those products that should be regulated, which are then included in new 
legislation if the legislature accepts the recommendations.116 Under the 
second approach, the “framework/agency” approach, the named state 
agency uses the selection criteria and factors to determine, through a 
public process, those products that are to be regulated under an EPR 
program.117 The key difference is that the former approach vests the 
ultimate decision-making authority with the state legislature and the 
legislative process, while the latter approach vests the decision-making 
authority with the named state agency and the regulatory process. 
2. Individual Versus Collective Take-Back 
The next EPR concept, the degree of cooperation or responsibility 
among producers for taking back their products, is crucial in determining 
the effectiveness of EPR laws in achieving product redesign. Only those 
EPR laws that require individual producer responsibility, as opposed to 
collective responsibility, will create true cost internalization and 
subsequent product redesign.118 Thus, EPR regulatory regimes can, and 
should, call for individual producer responsibility, under which a 
producer is individually responsible for the take-back and end-of-life 
management of its products. 
 112 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1772 (Westlaw 2013); A. 6293, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. 
(N.Y. 2011); H.B. 2017, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011); H.B. 3060, 75th Leg. Assem., Reg. 
Sess. (Or. 2009); S. 2027, 2012 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2012). 
 113 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1771-1775; see also Press Release, Prod. Policy Inst., 
supra note 9. 
 114 A.B. 2139, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); Mass. H.B. 2017; H.F. 2407, 86th Sess. 
(Minn. 2009); N.Y. A. 6293; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027; H. 696, 2009-2010 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2010); 
H.B. 1718, 61st Leg., 2009 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009). 
 115 PROD. STEWARDSHIP INST., supra note 8. 
 116 See Maine’s framework law and the recent framework bills introduced in California, 
Minnesota, New York, and Vermont: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1771-1775; Cal. A.B. 2139; 
Minn. H.F. 2407; N.Y. A. 6293; Vt. H. 696. 
 117 See the recent framework bills introduced in Massachusetts, Oregon, and Rhode Island: 
Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027 . 
 118 See Sachs, supra note 26, at 75-76; VAN ROSSEM ET AL., supra note 99, at 6. 
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However, there are EPR laws and bills that give producers or 
manufacturers the option of whether to be individually or collectively 
responsible for end-of-life product management.119 While not as 
effective as individual producer responsibility, this approach may be a 
suitable one, as the International Institute for Industrial Environmental 
Economics concluded in its report: “The fact that EPR law is meant to be 
goal-oriented . . . suggests that producers should be allowed to 
collectively organize . . . take-back and recycling systems. In fact, in 
many cases it may be rational to do so from both an economic and 
environmental perspective.”120 If producers are given the option and 
elect to collectively organize, it will be necessary for producers to 
maintain individual financial responsibility for their new products in 
order to ensure proper cost internalization and product redesign.121 The 
focus is on a producer’s new products because the design of old products 
cannot be changed retroactively and thus cost internalization is not as 
vital for those prod 122
3. Product Recovery Mechanisms and Performance Goals 
Under an EPR take-back program, a potential problem is that the 
disposal of waste in landfills and incinerators will continue to occur and 
the responsibility for disposal will only be shifted to the producers. Such 
an outcome would fail to achieve the waste diversion and resource 
conservation goals. The solution is to include within an EPR law two 
related components: a product recovery mechanism and performance 
goals. Both of these pieces are necessary, because without mandatory 
reuse and recycling provisions or performance goals there would be 
almost no benefit from requiring producers to take back the products if 
they are ultimately to be landfilled or incinerated.123 
The product recovery mechanism is a mandate that all discarded 
products collected by the producer be reused or recycled by the 
producer.124 In some of the new EPR framework bills these mandates fall 
within the producers’ prescribed product stewardship programs.125 These 
EPR framework bills also contain a narrow exception that allows 
 119 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1672; Mass. H.B. 2017; Minn. H.F. 2407; N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 149-M:58-a (Westlaw 2013); Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027; Vt. H. 696. 
 120 VAN ROSSEM ET AL., supra note 99, at 25. 
 121 Id. at 7. 
 122 Id. at 7. 
 123 See Sachs, supra note 26, at 80. 
 124 See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 42970-42983 (Westlaw 2013); Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 
3060; R.I. S. 2027. 
 125 See Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027. 
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products to be properly “disposed” only if the “applicable product-
specific rule” promulgated by the state so permits.126 However, this 
exception is largely insignificant in light of EPR goals, because the focus 
is first on reusing and recycling the product, and disposal may occur only 
if the agency allows. 
Related to the product recovery mandate are enforceable 
performance goals, which are “metrics established by the producer or the 
state to measure on an annual basis the performance of a product 
stewardship program in addressing recycling, reuse, safe disposal, 
environmental impacts or health impacts related to a product.”127 
Producers must include these goals within their product stewardship 
plans, which are submitted to the state for approval and must include the 
total amount collected, the collection rate, and the disposition rate.128 
These goals will be measured annually and will be enforced by the state; 
producers who violate them will be subject to significant civil 
penalties.129 
4. Product Design Goals 
Another important EPR concept is the inclusion of mechanisms to 
prompt sustainable product redesign either through voluntary “product 
goals” or mandated consideration of design changes. These mechanisms 
prompt producers to consider design and manufacturing changes by 
either allowing or requiring them to adopt product goals. These 
mechanisms are a new concept in EPR laws in the United States, and 
they have been included in the EPR framework bills introduced in the 
last few years.130 While most pre-existing EPR laws in the United States 
include the foundational take-back element of the EPR doctrine—leading 
to cost internalization and subsequent redesign—they do not include 
express provisions aimed specifically at triggering product redesign. 
Some of the recent EPR framework bills include a provision that allows 
producers to establish voluntary product goals, typically defined as “any 
change in the design and manufacture of a product that reduces or has the 
potential to reduce environmental or health impacts.”131 Moreover, if a 
producer does adopt product goals, it must include them in its product 
 126 Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027. 
 127 Cal. A.B. 2139, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. 
S. 2027. 
 128 Cal. A.B. 2139; Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027. 
 129 See, e.g., Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027. 
 130 Cal. A.B. 2139; Mass. H.B. 2017; H.F. 2407, 86th Sess. (Minn. 2009); Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. 
S. 2027. 
 131 Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027; see also Cal. A.B. 2139. 
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stewardship plan submitted to the state.132 
Other recent EPR framework bills employ a more direct approach in 
prompting design changes. Although some framework bills merely 
permit producers to develop voluntary product redesign goals, 
California’s bill appears to require producers to adopt product goals that 
address “the use of virgin material . . . , the impact upon, or use of, water 
or energy by the covered product, the use of, or generation of hazardous 
substances by the covered product, the carbon footprint . . . , the . . . 
product’s longevity, the recycled content of the . . . product, and [its] 
recyclability.”133 Additionally, California’s bill mandates that a 
producer’s product stewardship plan “address the environmental impacts 
of the covered product over the entire life-cycle of that product, 
including the product design [and] manufacture.”134 Similarly, 
Minnesota’s bill also states that a producer’s product stewardship plan 
must include “product design changes that will be considered to reduce 
toxicity, water use, or energy use or to increase recycled content, 
recyclability, or product longevity.”135 
In both approaches, it is the producers that determine what the goals 
or changes will be. In either instance, if or when product goals are 
adopted, they are not enforceable and there is no requirement that 
producers achieve the goals.136 This lack of enforceability, however, 
further encourages producers to freely consider and implement design 
changes without the danger of incurring penalties if producers fail to 
meet their goals. 
5. Enforcement and Penalty Mechanisms 
The last major components of EPR laws are enforcement and 
penalty mechanisms, which ensure that producers will comply with a 
state’s EPR program. Generally, a producer and a retailer are not allowed 
to sell or distribute a regulated product unless the producer has submitted 
a product stewardship plan137 or participates in an approved product 
stewardship program for that product.138 Moreover, to enforce these 
provisions, EPR laws can impose penalties for violations. Penalty 
 132 Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027. 
 133 Cal. A.B. 2139. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Minn. H.F. 2407. 
 136 See, e.g., Cal. A.B. 2139; Mass. H.B. 2017; Minn. H.F. 2407; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027. 
 137 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 42974(b) (Westlaw 2013); Cal. A.B. 2139; Mass. H.B. 
2017. 
 138 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 149-M:58-a(IV) (Westlaw 2013); Minn. H.F. 2407; Or. 
H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027; H. 696, 2009-2010 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2010). 
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provisions can be broad, covering any violation of the statute by any 
person, and range from $1,000 to $25,000 for each day the violation 
continues or for each violation.139 Alternatively, penalty provisions can 
be much more narrow and specifically target producers and or retailers. 
In these latter types of penalty provisions, a producer can be fined for 
each day it is not participating in an approved product stewardship 
program covering the product, or for not implementing an approved 
product stewardship plan.140 In addition, retailers can be fined for 
continuing to sell a product from a producer who is not participating in a 
product stewardship program or otherwise not in compliance with the 
EPR statute.141 
V. A SOUND EPR LAW, ITS CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES AND A 
FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE 
The political environment is changing with respect to EPR 
legislation. More states are now regulating more products through the 
product-by-product approach discussed earlier.142 In addition, EPR 
framework laws are gaining traction, with the enactment of Maine’s first-
in-the-nation framework law and the introduction of eight more 
framework bills since then.143 This Part recommends which concepts and 
mechanisms should be included to create an ideal framework law. This 
Part will also address potential constitutional hurdles to such EPR laws 
and will consider national EPR legislation as an alternative to the current 
state-by-state approach. 
A. THE IDEAL EPR FRAMEWORK 
In order to achieve the immediate goals of closing the gap on the 
remaining amount of MSW still being landfilled or incinerated, 
conserving natural resources, and prompting product redesign, states 
should enact EPR framework laws instead of relying on the traditional 
product-by-product approach. Framework laws can serve as a more 
efficient and effective way of including all those products in the waste 
stream that cannot be recycled, composted, or reused through current 
municipal efforts. 
Though states should follow Maine’s general efforts, they should 
not model their framework laws too closely on Maine’s approach. 
 139 See, e.g., Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027. 
 140 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 42978; Cal. A.B. 2139; Minn. H.F. 2407; Vt. H. 696. 
 141 See, e.g., Minn. H.F. 2407; Vt. H. 696. 
 142 See PROD. STEWARDSHIP INST., supra note 8; PROD. STEWARDSHIP INST., supra note 94. 
 143 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1771-1775 (Westlaw 2013). 
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Maine’s three-page framework bill144 presents the bare minimum of an 
EPR framework law. Moreover, Maine’s law does not differ much from 
the traditional product-by-product approach logistically because it still 
requires the legislature to pass a new law for each new product to be 
regulated under its framework law.145 In moving forward, states should 
design their EPR framework laws to include all the concepts and 
mechanisms previously discussed. Some state framework bills have 
already included many of those mechanisms, but none of the bills are 
drafted in such a way as to achieve complete zero waste. 
First, in regard to product selection mechanisms, states should use 
the framework/agency approach, under which a set of criteria or factors, 
established by the state’s legislature, are used by a designated state 
agency to recommend products for inclusion in a product stewardship 
program, and the state agency makes the ultimate determination of which 
products will be regulated.146 This approach significantly limits 
inefficiency and delay inherent in the framework/legislature and product-
by-product approaches. Agencies tasked with identifying those products 
requiring EPR can act in a more timely and efficient manner than state 
legislatures. Furthermore, the framework/legislative and product-by-
product approaches will lead to the regulation of fewer products and 
delay expanded implementation of EPR.147 
Although this approach vests the agency with the decision-making 
authority, the agency does not make the decision independently. Those 
new framework bills that utilize the framework/agency approach require 
that the public be involved throughout the product selection process, with 
the opportunity for written comments to be given and at least one public 
hearing to be held.148 In addition, the agency must create and seek 
guidance from an advisory committee, composed of members 
representing producers, local government, environmental groups, the 
solid waste or recycling industry, and the retail industry.149 These 
elements will work to ensure that an open, public process is used, which 
will be vital to maintain accountability, given that unelected agency 
officials rather than the elected representatives in the legislature will be 
deciding which products to regulate. 
Second, with respect to the type of take-back mechanism used, there 
 144 2010 Me. Legis. Serv. Ch. 516 (H.P. 1159) (L.D. 1631) (Westlaw 2013). 
 145 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1772(2), 1773. 
 146 See, e.g., H.B. 2017, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011); H.B. 3060, 75th Leg. Assem., 
Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S. 2027, 2012 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2012). 
 147 See, e.g., A.B. 2139, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); H.F. 2407, 86th Sess. (Minn. 
2009); H. 696, 2009-2010 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2010). 
 148 Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027. 
 149 Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027. 
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are two options states can follow: states should design their framework 
laws to achieve individual producer take-back and responsibility or allow 
for collective take-back that still requires producers to bear individual 
financial responsibility for new products. In order to achieve cost 
internalization and encourage product redesign, producers must have 
individual rather than collective responsibility over their products.150 
However, most of the framework bills introduced in the last few years 
give producers the option to collectively organize in taking back and 
managing their products.151 Arguably, because individual take-back and 
responsibility leads to greater cost internalization by the producers, 
producers will likely opt to collectively organize, which could lead to the 
problems that Professor Sachs discusses in his Article.152 Nonetheless, 
giving producers the option may be sufficient; so long as producers 
maintain individual financial responsibility over their new products while 
undertaking collective responsibility over their old products, the true 
product costs should still be internalized.153 
A third, related element that has been included in some of the recent 
bills is the product goal defined as an adopted change in the design and 
manufacture of a product to increase the sustainability of that product. 
States should look to including this mechanism in their EPR framework 
laws because this tool may be effective enough to supplement any 
potential lack of cost internalization arising from producers opting for 
collective responsibility. Many of the new framework bills include this 
element in an effort to encourage producers to voluntarily reexamine 
their products’ design and manufacturing processes and reduce the 
associated environmental impacts of the products.154 Provisions that 
require a producer to address the environmental impacts of the product’s 
design and manufacturing process and include product goals aimed at 
reducing the product’s adverse impacts will have a greater likelihood of 
achieving product redesign, and thus states should include a mandatory 
product goal provision.155 Such a provision will likely serve as a safety 
net and ensure that product redesign will occur in the event that cost 
internalization fails to bring about such change. 
Fourth, with respect to product recovery mechanisms and 
performance goals, states must include both of these EPR policy tools in 
 150 See Sachs, supra note 26, at 75-76; VAN ROSSEM ET AL., supra note 99, at 6. 
 151 See Cal. A.B. 2139; Mass. H.B. 2017; Minn. H.F. 2407; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027; Vt. 
H. 696. 
 152 Sachs, supra note 26, at 75-76. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027. 
 155 See Cal. A.B. 2139; see also Minn. H.F. 2407 (requiring producers to include in the 
product stewardship plan product design changes that will be considered by the producer). 
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order to maximize waste diversion and resource conservation. These 
reuse and recycling mandates and performance goals will conserve 
limited resources and help make certain that regulated products do not 
end up in landfills or incinerators. Without such provisions, producers 
could simply landfill or incinerate the collected products and there would 
be no point to requiring product take-back.156 The performance goals, 
which will generally be set by the producers and enforced by the state, 
are another means of creating producer accountability and will work to 
ensure that producers actually engage in resource recovery. In addition, 
such performance goals should increase over time, perhaps annually or 
every two years, thereby acting as a technology-forcing mechanism and 
leading to more sustainable product design and manufacturing processes. 
Furthermore, mandated recovery, reuse, and recycling provisions and 
goals will work to increase the costs that producers must face. Under the 
current framework bills, a producer would be required to reuse or recycle 
the product in its entirety unless the state grants an exemption. Thus, in 
light of these added costs, such provisions should further prompt product 
redesign. 
Lastly, in order to ensure that producers comply with these 
important provisions and mechanisms, state framework legislation 
should have enforcement and penalty provisions. Framework laws 
should prohibit a producer (and retailers) from selling or distributing a 
regulated product unless the producer has submitted a product 
stewardship plan for that product157 or participates in an approved 
product stewardship program for that product. Moreover, penalty 
provisions should be drafted broadly to include any violation of the 
statute by any person. 
While a framework law with these recommended provisions should 
be able to significantly advance the zero waste and EPR goals discussed 
earlier, simply adopting a framework law with these components will not 
suffice. A hybrid approach should be pursued. In addition to such a 
framework law, cities, counties, and states should look to adopting a 
mandatory recycling and composting ordinance or law, like that of San 
Francisco,158 which is arguably the biggest, if not the sole, reason for its 
current seventy-seven percent diversion rate. Accordingly, once an 
adequate EPR framework law has been established, it will be necessary 
to then target those products that are still being landfilled and incinerated 
 156 See Sachs, supra note 26, at 80. 
 157 See Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027. Product stewardship plans describe the 
producer’s program for collection; recycling, reuse, or disposal of products; and any related 
performance or product goals. 
 158 See S. F., Cal., Ordinance 100-09 (June 9, 2009). 
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or not already regulated under the existing EPR laws. 
B. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE EPR LAWS 
EPR laws have yet to face significant legal challenge. But as the 
number and complexity of EPR laws expand, regulated producers will 
predictably raise constitutional challenges under the Equal Protection 
Clause and Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.159 A well-
designed EPR law, however, should be able to withstand such 
constitutional scrutiny.160 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that “no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”161 The U.S. Supreme Court has construed 
the Equal Protection Clause as prohibiting government action that 
involves irrational classifications.162 Because EPR laws will differentiate 
between products—imposing end-of-life responsibility on the producers 
of some products, but not others—they must withstand rational-basis 
review (as opposed to intermediate or strict-scrutiny review because 
producers are not a protected class entitled to heightened scrutiny). 
The rational-basis test would be used to determine whether state 
laws regulating goods and products violate the Equal Protection Clause 
and presents a fairly low burden.163 So long as “the question is at least 
debatable” and “there was evidence before the legislature reasonably 
supporting the classification,” such challenges to state laws cannot 
succeed.164 A state would have a myriad of rational bases for creating an 
EPR law, such as conserving valuable natural resources; protecting the 
 159 While an EPR law may raise substantive due process issues as well, challenges on this 
basis would likely fail, given the extremely low burden required to uphold the law and the great 
deference afforded to the government. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that the State may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Substantive due process focuses on whether the government 
has an adequate basis for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. See IRWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 603 (3d ed. 2009). Since 1937, no state or federal law has been held to 
violate the Constitution on economic substantive due process grounds. Irwin Chemerinsky explains: 
“The [Supreme] Court has made it clear that economic regulations . . . will be upheld when 
challenged under the Due Process Clause so long as they are rationally related to a legitimate 
government purpose. The government’s purpose can be any goal not prohibited by the Constitution. 
In fact, it does not need to be proven that the asserted purpose was the legislature’s actual objective. 
Any conceivable purpose is sufficient.” Id. at 628. 
 160 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 161 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 162 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (“The State may 
not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the 
distinction arbitrary or irrational.”). 
 163 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 (1981). 
 164 Id. at 464. 
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environment from air, water, and soil pollution; and improving the public 
health by moving away from landfilling and incineration toward 
recycling, composting, and product take-back. Therefore, in light of the 
low rational-basis threshold and the significant likelihood that the state 
would have a legitimate interest in its EPR law that is rationally related 
to the state’s goals, any Equal Protection Clause challenge against a state 
EPR law would most likely be unsuccessful.165 
The Commerce Clause also has the potential to obstruct EPR laws. 
The Commerce Clause grants to Congress the power “[t]o regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States.”166 It has long been established 
that even in the absence of Congress exercising this power, the 
Commerce Clause prevents states from creating statutes or regulations 
that unreasonably burden interstate commerce.167 This restriction on the 
states’ authority is known as the “dormant Commerce Clause.”168 
Because EPR laws require producers to bear physical and financial 
responsibility of certain products at the end of their lives, and thus 
increase costs of production, such laws could conceivably impose 
burdens on interstate commerce. 
The process for determining whether a state statute or regulation 
violates the dormant Commerce Clause involves a two-step analysis: 1) 
the court must determine whether “a state statute directly regulates or 
discriminates against interstate commerce, or [whether] its effect is to 
favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests,” and 2) “if 
the state regulation is neither discriminatory nor extraterritorial, then the 
court must apply the balancing test set forth in Pike [v. Bruce Church, 
Inc.]”169 In particular, a state law or regulation is discriminatory if it 
“directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when 
its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state 
interests.”170 A state law or regulation is extraterritorial, and thus per se 
invalid, when it “directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside 
the boundaries of [the state].”171 A statute or regulation that is not 
discriminatory or extraterritorial must still pass the Pike balancing test, 
which weighs the local benefits against the burden on interstate 
 165 See id. at 470; Shamrock Farms Co. v. Veneman, 146 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 166 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 167 Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978); Clover Leaf Creamery, 
449 U.S. at 470-71. 
 168 See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 644 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 169 Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 700 F.3d 796, 803-04 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 471; Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 
336, 340-41 (1989); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 170 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); see 
also Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 803. 
 171 Healy, 491 U.S. at 336; Boggs, 622 F.3d at 645. 
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commerce: “Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are 
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.”172 
While there have been no cases expressly determining the 
constitutionality of a state EPR law, there have been decisions dealing 
with related laws regulating goods and products, such as product labeling 
restrictions,173 packaging bans,174 and various size and body regulations 
for tractor-trailers.175 Their discussion and analysis lend themselves to 
determining the potential outcome for EPR laws. 
In a string of decisions over four decades, the U.S. Supreme Court 
analyzed whether a state can regulate the size or certain body 
specifications of tractor-trailers involved in interstate transport. The 
Court ultimately concluded that despite a state’s “broad” and “pervasive” 
power to regulate the use of its highways, as well as the great deference 
afforded to states in regulating local safety, a state may not regulate 
trailer design or require the use of certain mudguards for tractor-trailers, 
nor may it regulate the length of tractor-trailers, if the resulting burdens 
on interstate commerce clearly exceed the local benefits.176 The Court’s 
decisions turned on the principle that state laws should not be 
inconsistent with most or almost all of the other similarly situated states’ 
regulations.177 
The Supreme Court has also upheld a state ban on the use of certain 
packaging despite the fact that in-state producers would benefit and out-
of-state producers would be burdened.178 The purpose of the state ban 
was to conserve natural resources and energy and to ease solid waste 
 172 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 173 Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001); Boggs, 622 F.3d at 628; 
Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 800. 
 174 Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 456. 
 175 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 521-23 (1959); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. 
v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
 176 Bibb, 359 U.S. at 528-29; Raymond Motor Transp., 434 U.S. at 447-48; Kassel, 450 U.S. 
at 671. But see S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 196 (1938) (“It 
plainly cannot be said that the width of trucks used on the highways in South Carolina is unrelated to 
their safety and cost of maintenance, or that a 90-inch width limitation, adopted to safeguard the 
highways of the state, is not within the range of the permissible legislative choice.”). 
 177 Bibb, 359 U.S. at 526, 529-30 (“A State which insists on a design out of line with the 
requirements of almost all the other States may sometimes place a great burden of delay and 
inconvenience on those interstate motor carriers entering or crossing its territory.”); Kassel, 450 U.S. 
at 671 (“Iowa’s law is now out of step with the laws of all other Midwestern and Western States. 
Iowa thus substantially burdens the interstate flow of goods by truck.”). 
 178 Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 458, 472-73. 
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disposal problems.179 The Court concluded that the law was not 
discriminatory and, further, that any incidental burden on interstate 
commerce was not clearly excessive in light of the state’s environmental 
and waste management interests.180 
Lastly, there have been several cases involving challenges to state 
product labeling requirements for goods, such as mercury-containing 
products,181 milk products,182 and beverage containers.183 In these cases, 
the primary issue was whether the state laws were extraterritorial and 
thus per se invalid. In concluding that the laws were not extraterritorial, 
the courts focused on the fact that these state labeling laws had no 
bearing on how the manufacturers were required to label the same 
products in other states.184 Moreover, in response to one challenger’s 
argument that the law exposed it to the possibility of multiple labeling 
standards, one court simply held that there needed to be an actual conflict 
between competing regulations before either would be found invalid.185 
A state EPR law would most likely not be invalid per se as long as 
the law applied to all producers of that regulated product and is drafted 
in such a way that it does not directly control conduct completely outside 
the state’s borders. All of the recent EPR framework bills apply even-
handedly to all persons who manufacture, import, or own the name, 
brand, or license of a product that is sold or distributed within the 
relevant state.186 Thus, there is no distinction between in-state and out-
of-state producers. Additionally, these laws have no bearing on how 
producers of regulated products are to manage those same end-of-life 
products upon disposal in other states.187 Therefore, because state EPR 
laws would likely not be deemed discriminatory or extraterritorial, the 
focus would likely be on whether the burden imposed on interstate 
 179 Id. at 458. 
 180 Id. at 471-73. The Ninth Circuit has also addressed a Commerce Clause challenge to a 
California law that governed the composition of consumer milk. Shamrock Farms Co. v. Veneman, 
146 F.3d 1177, 1178 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the analysis and outcome are not helpful in 
determining the constitutionality of an EPR law because Congress had immunized the state’s law 
from Commerce Clause challenges, which it had authority to do. Id. at 1180. Thus, although the 
court held that the state law did not violate the Commerce Clause, the court did not address the 
ultimate issue of whether the law overburdened interstate commerce. Id. at 1179-81. 
 181 Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 182 Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 632-33 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 183 Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 700 F.3d 796, 800 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 184 Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 110; Boggs, 622 F.3d at 647. But see Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 
810. 
 185 Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 112. 
 186 A.B. 2139, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); H.B. 2017, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 
2011); H.F. 2407, 86th Sess. (Minn. 2009); H.B. 3060, 75th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S. 
2027, 2012 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2012); H. 696, 2009-2010 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2010). 
 187 See Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 110; Boggs, 622 F.3d at 647. 
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commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits. 
In light of the above cases, particularly those dealing with tractor-
trailer regulations and product labeling, arguments could be made that a 
state EPR law runs afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. Challengers 
to a state EPR law could potentially argue that differing state EPR 
standards and requirements would result in producers having to comply 
with multiple and possibly conflicting regulatory regimes. Thus, the laws 
would impose an excessive burden on interstate commerce. This 
“conflicting regulatory regimes” analysis was the primary rationale for 
the Supreme Court striking down state laws regulating the size and 
mudguard specifications of tractor-trailers that deviated substantially 
from surrounding states’ regulations.188 Challengers to state labeling 
standards made the same argument, but the Second Circuit held that “[i]t 
is not enough to point to a risk of conflicting regulatory regimes in 
multiple states; there must be an actual conflict between the challenged 
regulation and those in place in other states.”189 
Here, however, current state EPR laws utilize the same basic take-
back requirements and resource recovery mandates, and thus do not 
conflict. Even when there are differences, they are merely minor 
deviations and do not result in drastic differences that would amount to 
the complete halting of the movement of goods across state lines. 
Moreover, most of the new EPR framework bills include provisions that 
require the state to consult and coordinate with other states in order to 
achieve consistency in the development and implementation of the 
product stewardship system,190 look to those products regulated under a 
product stewardship program in other states when determining which 
products to regulate,191 or encourage the inclusion and participation of 
other states when selecting products to regulate under a product 
stewardship program.192 
Under the Pike balancing test, once a legitimate local purpose is 
found, “the question becomes one of degree,” and courts will look to 
whether the local interest “could be promoted as well with a lesser 
impact on interstate activities.”193 Waste management has traditionally 
been a state and local government function, and therefore courts are 
reluctant to infringe upon this authority.194 In addition, conservation of 
 188 Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981); Bibb v. Navajo 
Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959). 
 189 Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 112. 
 190 Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027. 
 191 Cal. A.B. 2139. 
 192 H.B. 2017, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011). 
 193 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 194 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344 
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natural resources and energy and alleviating waste disposal issues have 
been recognized as legitimate, substantial state interests.195 Thus, there is 
already a strong presumption in the validity of a state EPR law, the 
purpose of which is to promote better waste management solutions and 
reduce the burden on natural resources extraction. While there very well 
may be a modicum of burden imposed on interstate commerce, existing 
case law supports the conclusion that such burden is not “clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”196 
C. NATIONAL EPR LEGISLATION 
An alternative to a state EPR framework law is national EPR 
legislation. There is currently no federal regulatory system directly 
governing MSW reduction or generation.197 Although RCRA addresses 
solid and hazardous waste disposal, this law is aimed at providing 
guidelines and minimum compliance standards while deferring to state 
and local solid waste regulatory authority.198 A national EPR law would 
arguably be more efficient than fifty separate state laws. Many in the 
manufacturing industry would prefer a single, uniform EPR approach, 
claiming that the current patchwork of state EPR laws is too costly.199 In 
addition, a federal law would sidestep the constitutionality issues 
discussed above, allowing the federal government to take a more 
command-and-control approach with respect to directly regulating the 
end-of-life management of a product. Such federal legislation could take 
at least one of two forms: amending RCRA to include EPR provisions, or 
creating an entirely new EPR statute and regulatory regime modeled on 
the state law approach.200 
When Congress created RCRA, it declared that our increasing 
generation of solid and hazardous waste is creating environmental and 
public health impacts and that hazardous waste, in particular, should be 
(2007). 
 195 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 (1981). 
 196 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 197 See McCrea, supra note 89, at 517. 
 198 RCRA, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6902, 6907, 6941 (Westlaw 2013); see also, RCRA State 
Authorization, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, www.epa.gov/osw/laws-regs/state/index.htm (last 
updated Nov. 15, 2012). 
 199 See NAT’L CTR. FOR ELEC. RECYCLING, A STUDY OF THE STATE-BY-STATE E-WASTE 
PATCHWORK: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS ECONOMIC AND OTHER EFFECTS ON INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT 
AND CONSUMERS (2006); CHAZ MILLER, NAT’L SOLID WASTES MGMT. ASS’N, FROM BIRTH TO 
REBIRTH: WILL PRODUCT STEWARDSHIP SAVE RESOURCES? 9, ABA Section of Environment, 
Energy, and Resources Section Fall Meeting, Oct. 2011. 
 200 See McCrea, supra note 89, at 527. 
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reduced or eliminated.201 Therefore, amending RCRA to include EPR 
provisions would be consistent with the Act’s underlying purpose. While 
the federal government cannot legally require states to legislate a certain 
way,202 it can incentivize states to take legislative action by 
unambiguously conditioning the receipt of federal funds on compliance 
with federal statutory directives that are related to the purpose of the 
funds.203 
RCRA already ties federal grants to the approval of states’ solid 
waste management plans and provides for minimum criteria that must be 
included in a plan for it to be approved.204 Therefore, amending RCRA 
would not have to be very drastic and could maintain the current 
regulatory practice in place, under which states carry out waste 
management practices through the development of approved state 
management plans. Such an amendment could simply change the 
statutory and regulatory requirements for the approval of state 
management plans205 by mandating that such plans provide for the 
development of EPR framework programs. In fact, federal regulations 
are already moving in this direction by requiring that state plans “provide 
for a policy and strategy for encouragement of resource recovery and 
conservation activities”206 and recommending that states “encourage the 
development of resource recovery and resource conservation facilities 
and practices as the preferred means of solid waste management.”207 
These regulations could be augmented to require more than mere 
“encouragement” and to address specific EPR practices. In addition, by 
amending the state plan criteria, the federal government can specify what 
the product stewardship programs must include in order to obtain federal 
approval, thereby ensuring a more uniform and consistent EPR policy. 
As an alternative to RCRA amendment, an entirely new federal 
law—a “Product Stewardship Act”—could be passed to address EPR. 
Such a law should include all those recommended concepts and 
mechanisms discussed earlier and could be modeled on the Consumer 
Product Safety Act, which was passed to protect the public from 
unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products through 
the development of uniform safety standards.208 Under the proposed 
“Product Stewardship Act,” a Product Stewardship Commission would 
 201 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901, 6902 (Westlaw 2013). 
 202 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). 
 203 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987). 
 204 42 U.S.C.A. § 6947 (Westlaw 2013). 
 205 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6942, 6943 (Westlaw 2013); 40 C.F.R. pt. 256 (Westlaw 2013). 
 206 40 C.F.R. § 256.30 (emphasis added). 
 207 40 C.F.R. § 256.31 (emphasis added). 
 208 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2051-2089 (Westlaw 2013). 
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be created and would be granted the authority of determining which 
products to regulate, prescribing resource recovery standards and 
performance and product goals, and enforcing the provisions of the 
statute. 
Such a new federal law would likely result in preemption of current 
state EPR laws in order to maximize regulatory efficiency. In fact, some 
of the recent state framework bills contemplate the possibility of a 
stricter federal law by requiring the state to evaluate such federal law to 
determine if it meets or exceeds the requirements of the state’s law and 
to provide a report to the state’s legislature.209 One way to alleviate any 
potential for state opposition and ensure a smooth transition to a national 
regulatory regime would be to allow state EPR laws to remain in place 
for those products that the federal law is not yet regulating. 
While a federal EPR law is preferable to fifty individual state laws, 
federal EPR legislation does not appear to be coming anytime soon. Such 
proposed legislation would also likely face stiff opposition from well-
funded and powerful lobbying groups such as the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 
and the National Electrical Manufacturers Association. But state EPR 
laws have confronted oppositional lobbying efforts as well.210 In light of 
how far away a federal EPR law is and the uphill battle proponents will 
face in passing one, states should continue passing their own framework 
laws in the interim. Such continued and diverse state efforts will only 
build momentum for a federal law and lead to better regulation that 
further protects the environment, its natural resources, and the public 
from the significant, adverse effects caused by our status quo waste 
management practices. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The numerous adverse environmental and public health effects that 
stem from our current waste management practices have prompted cities, 
 209 H.B. 2017, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011); H.B. 3060, 75th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. 
(Or. 2009); S. 2027, 2012 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2012); H. 696, 2009-2010 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 
2010). 
 210 See Melinda Burns, The Smoldering Trash Revolt, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 21, 2010), 
available at www.miller-mccune.com/business-economics/the-smoldering-trash-revolt-7306/; see, 
e.g., Tim Faulkner, Lobbyists Invade Producer Responsibility Hearing, ECORI NEWS (Apr. 12, 
2012), www.exporter.com/social-entrepreneur/corporate-responsibility/lobbyists-invade-producer-
responsibility-hearing-ecori-news/; Jerry Elmer, Why Producer Responsibility Makes Sense for 
Rhode Island, CLF SCOOP (Apr. 2, 2012), www.clf.org/blog/rhode-island/why-producer-
responsibility-makes-sense-for-rhode-island/; NAT’L ELEC. MFR. ASS’N, WHAT HAVE WE DONE FOR 
YOU LATELY? 10-11 (2012) (outlining NEMA’s successful efforts in the past year in defeating EPR 
laws), available at www.nema.org/Members-Only/Documents/WHWDFYL.pdf. 
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counties, and states to enact new innovative policies. Two of these 
policies, zero waste and EPR, are designed to change the way in which 
waste is ultimately managed and are aimed at achieving, among other 
things, complete waste diversion from landfills and incinerators, resource 
conservation, and sustainable product redesign. 
Current zero waste policies around the country appear to be focused 
purely on waste diversion using recycling, composting, and reuse efforts. 
While these practices are laudable and necessary, they are not enough to 
achieve true zero waste goals. In addition, localities or states should 
enact laws mandating recycling and composting, resulting in resource 
recovery to the greatest extent practicable. Still, even with these efforts 
in place, complete waste diversion would not be achieved and the larger 
problem of sustainable product design and manufacturing would 
similarly not be addressed. 
To fully achieve these goals, a state EPR framework law should be 
in place to require producers of those products still in the waste stream to 
take them back and manage them. The law must be a “framework” law 
that gives the state’s designated agency the ultimate authority for 
targeting those products that present waste management, environmental, 
and public health issues. Moreover, an effective EPR framework law 
must have provisions requiring the producer to reuse and recycle the 
product and to consider design and manufacture changes of the product. 
Though a federal EPR law that includes these same or similar 
provisions is preferred to a patchwork of state laws, a national regulatory 
regime is still too far away. Therefore, it is imperative that states 
continue to work in crafting framework legislation that would address, in 
product stewardship programs, those products presenting persistent waste 
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